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Homomorphic public-key cryptosystems
and encrypting boolean circuits
Abstract Given an arbitrary finite nontrivial group, we describe a probabilistic
public-key cryptosystem in which the decryption function is chosen to be a suit-
able epimorphism from the free product of finite Abelian groups onto this finite
group. It extends the quadratic residue cryptosystem (based on a homomorphism
onto the group of two elements) due to Rabin – Goldwasser – Micali. The security
of the cryptosystem relies on the intractability of factoring integers. As an immedi-
ate corollary of the main construction, we obtain a more direct proof (based on the
Barrington technique) of Sander-Young-Yung result on an encrypted simulation of
a boolean circuit of the logarithmic depth.
Keywords Homomorphic cryptosystem · Free product of groups · Encrypting
boolean circuits
1 Homomorphic cryptography over groups
The main purpose of the paper is to find probabilistic public-key schemes in which
the encryption function has a homomorphic property. More precisely, we are inter-
ested in a scheme in which the spaces of messages and of ciphertexts are groups Hk
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and Gk , respectively, depending on a security parameter k, and the decryption func-
tions fk : Gk → Hk are epimorphisms. In such a system the public key includes a
set of generators of the group ker( fk) and a system Rk of distinct representatives
of the group Gk by ker( fk) (transversal for a short). The probabilistic encryption
of a message h ∈ Hk is performed by computing an element grh ∈ Gk where
rh ∈ Rk is such that fk(rh) = h, and g is a random element of ker( fk). We call this
probabilistic public-key scheme a homomorphic cryptosystem with respect to the
epimorphisms fk . The security of such a system is based on the intractability of
deciding whether or not the element of Gk belongs to the normal subgroup ker( fk)
of Gk . The case of special interest is when the group Hk does not depend on the
security parameter k; in this case we speak on the homomorphic cryptosystem over
the group H . The general problem of constructing homomorphic cryptosystems
goes back to [22], (see also [6]). Concerning public-key cryptosystems using groups
(not necessary homomorphic ones) we refer to [2,9–11,13,14,16,21,22,25].
Let H be a finite group. A general approach to construct a homomorphic cryp-
tosystem over H can be explained as follows. Given a natural number k we find
groups Ak and Gk and an exact sequence of group homomorphisms
Ak
Pk→ Gk fk→ H →{1} (1)
(recall that the exact sequence means that the image of each homomorphism in it
coincides with the kernel of the next one) such that under Assumption 1.1 below the
homomorphism Pk and the inverse to fk are trapdoor functions. The latter means
that one can efficiently compute Pk(a), a ∈ Ak , and generate random elements
of the set f −1k (h), h ∈ H , while generating random elements of the set P−1k (g),
g ∈ Gk , as well as computing elements fk(g), g ∈ Gk , can be performed efficiently
only by means of secret keys.
Assumption 1.1 The problem TEST(Pk) of testing whether a given g ∈ Gk be-
longs to im(Pk) = ker( fk) is intractable.
In fact, this assumption implies that the homomorphic cryptosystem over the group
H with respect to the homomorphisms fk is semantically secure against a passive
adversary (see [7] and the proof of Theorem 2.1 below), whereas the intractability
of the following problem means that Pk is a trapdoor function.
Problem INVERSE(Pk). Given g ∈ im(Pk) find a random element a ∈ Ak such
that Pk(a) = g.
To our best knowledge all the considered so far homomorphic cryptosystems
are more or less extensions of the following one. Let n be the product of two distinct
large primes of (bit-)size k = O(log n). Set
Ak = Z∗n, Gk ={g ∈ Z∗n : Jn(g)= 1}, H = Z+2 (2)
where Jn denotes the Jacobi symbol. Then together with the natural homomor-
phisms Pk : Ak → Gk and fk : Gk → H induced by the squaring function,
these data define a homomorphic cryptosystem over H (see [7,8,15]). (In this case
computing f −1k is provided by a fixed nonsquare of G.) We call it the quadratic
residue cryptosystem. The security of this scheme is based on the quadratic resi-
due assumption for the group Gk (see [7,8,15]). A generalization of the quadratic
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residue cryptosystem using m-residues for m > 2 was proposed in [2] (see also
section 2 below). For the Paillier cryptosystem from [19] we have
Ak = Gk = Z∗n2 , Hk = Z+n
with the same assumptions on n and k as in the quadratic residue cryptosystem and
the corresponding homomorphisms Pk and fk being induced by raising to the nth
power. For the Okamoto–Uchiyama cryptosystem from [17] we have
Ak = Gk = Z∗p2q , Hk = Z+p
where p, q are distinct large primes of the same size k, and again the correspond-
ing homomorphisms Pk and fk being induced by raising to the nth power where
n = pq . Finally, we mention that homomorphic cryptosystems over certain dihedral
groups were studied in [21].
The main result of the present paper consists in the construction of a homomor-
phic cryptosystem over an arbitrary finite nontrivial group H ; the security of it is
based on the assumption on the intractability of the following slight generalization
of the factoring problem:
Problem FACTOR(n,m). Let n = pq where p and q are primes of the same size.
Suppose that m > 1 is a constant size divisor of p − 1 such that GCD(m, q −
1)= GCD(m, 2). Given a transversal of (Z∗n)m in the group Gn,m ={g ∈ Z∗n :
Jn(g) ∈ {1, (−1)m}}, find the numbers p, q.
First the main result is proved for a cyclic group H (see section 2), in this case the
groups Gk are finite and Abelian. Then in section 3 a homomorphic cryptosystem
is yielded for an arbitrary H , in this case the group Gk becomes a free product
of certain Abelian groups produced in section 2. In section 4 we recall the result
from [1] on a polynomial size simulation of any boolean circuit B of the logarith-
mic depth over an arbitrary unsolvable group H (in particular, one can take H to
be the symmetric group Sym(5)). Combining this result with the homomorphic
cryptosystem from section 3 provides an encrypted simulation of B over the group
Gk : the output of this simulation at a particular input is a certain element g ∈ Gk ,
and thereby to know the output of B one has to be able to calculate f (g) ∈ H ,
which is supposedly to be difficult due to Theorem 3.2. In contrast to a different
approach to encrypt boolean circuits proposed in [24], our construction is more
direct and allows one to accomplish the protocol called evaluating an encrypted
circuit (see section 4).
We complete the introduction by making some remarks concerning our con-
struction and cryptosystems based on groups. First, we notice that in the present
paper the group H is always rather small, while the groups Gk could be infinite but
being always finitely generated. However, the infiniteness of Gk is not an obstacle
for performing algorithms of encrypting and decrypting (for the latter using the
trapdoor information) since Gk is a free product of groups of a number-theoretic
nature like Z∗n ; therefore one can perform group operations in Gk efficiently and
on the other hand this allows one to provide evidence for the difficulty of a decryp-
tion. In this connection we mention a public-key cryptosystem from [5] in which
fk was the natural epimorphism from a free group Gk onto the group H (infinite,
non-Abelian in general) given by generators and relations. In this case for any
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element of H one can produce its preimages (encryptions) by inserting in a word
(being already a produced preimage of fk) from Gk any relation defining H . In
other terms, decrypting of fk reduces to the word problem in H . In our approach
the word problem is solvable easily due to a special presentation of the group Gk
(rather than given by generators and relations). The same is true for the homomor-
phic cryptosystem of [10] where free groups were given as subgroups of modular
groups.
Another idea of a homomorphic (in fact, isomorphic) encryption E (and a
decryption D = E−1) was proposed in [13]. Unlike our construction the encryp-
tion E : G → G is executed in the same set G (being an elliptic curve over the
ring Zn) treated as the set of plaintext messages. If n is composite, then G is not a
group while being endowed with a partially defined binary operation which con-
verts G in a group when n is prime. The problem of decrypting this cryptosystem
is close to the factoring of n. In this aspect [13] is similar to the well-known RSA
scheme (see e.g. [7]) if to interpret RSA as a homomorphism (in fact, isomorphism)
E : Z∗n → Z∗n , for which the security relies on the difficulty of finding the order
of the group Z∗n .
Finally, we mention some other cryptosystems using groups. The well-known
example is a cryptosystem which relies on the Diffie–Hellman key agreement pro-
tocol (see e.g. [7]). It involves cyclic groups and relates to the discrete logarithm
problem [14]; the complexity of this system was studied in [3]. Some generaliza-
tions of this system to non-Abelian groups (in particular, the matrix groups over
some rings) were suggested in [18] where security was based on an analog of the
discrete logarithm problems in groups of inner automorphisms. One more example
is a cryptosystem from [16] based on a monomorphism Z+m → Z∗n by means of
which x is encrypted by gx (mod n) where n, g constitute a public key; its decrypt-
ing relates to the discrete logarithm problem and is feasible in this situation due to
a special choice of n and m (cf. also [2]). Certain variations of the Diffie–Hellman
systems over the braid groups were described in [11]; there several trapdoor one-
way functions connected with the conjugacy and the taking root problems in the
braid groups were proposed.
2 Homomorphic cryptosystems over cyclic groups
To make the paper selfcontained we describe below an explicit homomorphic cryp-
tosystem over a cyclic group of an order m > 1 proposed in [2]. The decryption of
it is based on taking m-roots in the group Z∗n for a suitable n ∈ N. It can be consid-
ered in a sense as a generalization of the quadratic residue cryptosystem over Z+2(see (2)). Throughout this section we denote by |n| the bit size of a number n ∈ N.
Given a positive integer m > 1 denote by Dm the set of all pairs (p, q) where
p and q are distinct odd primes such that
p − 1 = 0 (mod m) and GCD(m, q − 1)= GCD(m, 2). (3)
Let (p, q) ∈ Dm , n = pq and Gn,m be a group defined by
Gn,m ={g ∈ Z∗n : Jn(g) ∈ {1, (−1)m}}. (4)
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Thus Gn,m = Z∗n for an odd m and [Z∗n : Gn,m]= 2 for an even m. In any case
this group contains each element h = h p × hq such that 〈h p〉= Z∗p and 〈hq〉= Z∗q
where h p and hq are the p-component and the q-component of h with respect to
the canonical decomposition Z∗n = Z∗p × Z∗q . From (3) it follows that m divides
the order of any such element h and {1, h, . . . , hm−1} is a transversal of the group
Gmn,m ={gm : g ∈ Gn,m} in Gn,m . This implies that Gn,m/Gmn,m ∼= Z+m where the
corresponding epimorphism is given by the mapping
fn,m : Gn,m → Z+m, g → ig
with ig being the element of Z+m such that g ∈ Gmn,mhig . From (3) it follows that
ker( fn,m)= Gmn,m = im(Pn,m) where
Pn,m : An,m → Gn,m, g → gm
is a homomorphism from the group An,m = Z∗n to the group Gn,m . In particular,
we have the exact sequence (1) with Ak = An,m , Pk = Pn,m , fk = fn,m , Gk = Gn,m
where k = |p| = |q|, and H = Z+m . Next, it is easily seen that any element of the set
Rn,m ={R ⊂ Gn,m : | fn,m(R)| = |R| =m}
is a right transversal of Gmn,m in Gn,m . We notice that by the Dirichlet theorem on
primes in arithmetic progressions (see e.g. [4]) the set Dm is not empty. Moreover,
by the same reason the set
Dk,m ={n ∈ N : n = pq, (p, q) ∈ Dm, |p| = |q| = k} (5)
is also nonempty for sufficiently large k ∈ N.
Let H be a cyclic group of order m > 1 (below without loss of generality we
assume that H =Z+m). We describe a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm which
yields a certain n ∈ Dk,m . The algorithm picks randomly integers p = 1 (mod m)
and q = − 1 (mod m) from the interval [2k, 2k+1] and tests primality of the picked
numbers by means of e.g. [23]. According to [4] there is a constant c > 0 such
that for any b relatively prime with m there are at least c2k/(ϕ(m)k) primes of
the form mx + b in the interval [2k, 2k+1]. Therefore, after O(k) attempts the
algorithm would yield a pair (p, q) ∈ Dk,m with a probability greater than  for a
certain constant 0 <  < 1. Thus given k ∈ N one can design in probabilistic time
kO(1) a number n ∈ Dk,m and a random element R ∈ Rn,m (see e.g. [16]). This
produces a homomorphic public-key cryptosystem S(H) over H with respect to
the homomorphisms fk : Gk → H where fk = fn,m and Gk = Gn,m . We also set
Ak = An,m and Pk = Pn,m .
Theorem 2.1 Let H be a cyclic group of order m > 1. Then under Assumption 1.1
the homomorphic cryptosystem S(H) is semantically secure against a passive
adversary. In addition, the problems INVERSE(Pn,m) and FACTOR(n,m) are
probabilistic polynomial time equivalent.
Proof We recall that the cryptosystem S(H) is semantically secure iff it is impossi-
ble in polynomial in k time to find h1, h2 ∈ H such that a probabilistic polynomial
time algorithm can’t distinguish for g ∈ Gk between fk(g)= h1 and fk(g)= h2
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(see [7]). Thus the first part of the theorem immediately follows from the definition
of the problem TEST(Pk) (cf. [8,7]).
To prove the second part suppose that we are given an algorithm solving the
problem FACTOR(n,m). Then one can find the decomposition n = pq . Now using
Rabin’s probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm for finding roots of polynomials
over finite prime fields (see [20]), one can solve the problem INVERSE(Pn,m) for
an element g ∈ Gn,m as follows:
Step 1. Find the numbers gp ∈ Z∗p and gq ∈ Z∗q such that g = gp × gq , i.e.
gp = g (mod p), gq = g (mod q).
Step 2. Apply Rabin’s algorithm for the field of order p to the polynomial xm −gp
and for the field of order q to the polynomial xm − gq . If at least one of these
polynomials has no roots, then output “P−1(g)=∅”; otherwise let h p and hq be
corresponding roots.
Step 3. Output “P−1n,m(g) 
= ∅” and h = h p × hq .
We observe that the set P−1n,m(g) is empty, i.e. that the g is not an m-power in Gn,m ,
iff at least one of the elements gp and gq found at Step 1 is not an m-power in Z∗p
and Z∗q , respectively. This implies the correctness of the output at Step 2. On the
other hand, if the procedure terminates at Step 3, then hm = hmp ×hmq = gp×gq = g,
i.e. h ∈ P−1n,m(g). Thus the problem INVERSE(Pn,m) is reduced to the problem
FACTOR(n,m) in probabilistic time kO(1).
Conversely, suppose that we are given an algorithm solving the problem
INVERSE (Pn,m). Then the following procedure using well-known observations
[7] enables us to find the decomposition n = pq .
Step 1. Randomly choose g ∈ Z∗n . Set T ={g}.
Step 2. While |T | < 3 − (m (mod 2)), add to T a random m-root of the element
gm yielded by the algorithm for the problem INVERSE(Pn,m).
Step 3. Choose h1, h2 ∈ T such that q = GCD(h1 − h2, n) 
= 1. Output q and
p = n/q .
To prove the correctness of the procedure we observe that there exists at least 2
(resp. 4) different m-roots of the element gm for odd m (resp. for even m) where
g is the element chosen at Step 1. So the loop at Step 2 and hence the entire pro-
cedure terminates with a large probability after a polynomial number of iterations.
Moreover, let Tq ={hq : h ∈ T } where hq is the q-component of h. Then from (3)
it follows that |Tq | = 1 for odd m, and |Tq | ≤ 2 for even m. Due to the construction
of T at Step 2 this implies that there exist different elements h1, h2 ∈ T such that
(h1)q = (h2)q , and consequently
h1 = (h1)q = (h2)q = h2 (mod q).
Since h1 
= h2 (mod n), we conclude that h1 −h2 is a multiple of q and the output
at Step 3 is correct. unionsq
6
We complete the section by mentioning that the decryption algorithm of the homo-
morphic cryptosystem S(H) can be slightly modified to avoid applying Rabin’s
algorithm for finding roots of polynomials over finite fields. Indeed, it is easy to see
that an element g = gp×gq of the group Gn,m belongs to the subgroup of m-powers
iff g(p−1)/m
′
p = 1 (mod p) and g(q−1)/m
′
q = 1 (mod q) where m′ = GCD(m, q −1).
3 Homomorphic cryptosystems using free products
Throughout the section we denote by WX the set of all the words w in the alpha-
bet X ; the length of w is denoted by |w|. We use the notation G =〈X;R〉 for a
presentation of a group G by the set X of generators and the set R of relations.
Sometimes we omit R to stress that the group G is generated by the set X . The
unity of G is denoted by 1G and we set G# = G \ {1G}.
3.1 Calculations in free products of groups
Let us remind the basic facts on free products of groups (see e.g. [12, Ch. 4]).
Let G1, . . . , Gn be finite groups, n ≥ 1. Given a presentation Gi =〈Xi ;Ri 〉,
1 ≤ i ≤ n, one can form a group G =〈X; R〉 where X = ∪ni = 1 Xi (the disjoint
union) and R= ∪ni = 1 Ri . It can be proved that this group does not depend on
the choice of presentations 〈Xi ;Ri 〉, 1 ≤ i ≤ n. It is called the free product of
the groups Gi and is denoted by G = G1 ∗ · · · ∗ Gn; one can see that it does not
depend on the order of factors. Without loss of generality we assume below that
Gi is a subgroup of G and Xi = G#i for all i . In this case G ⊂ WX and 1G equals
the empty word of WX . Moreover, it can be proved that
G = {x1 · · · xl ∈ WX : x j ∈ Gi j for 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
and i j 
= i j+1 for 1 ≤ j ≤ l − 1}. (6)
Thus each element of G is a word of WX in which no two adjacent letters belong
to the same set among the sets Xi , and any two such different words are different
elements of G. To describe the multiplication in G let us first define recursively
the mapping WX → G, w → w as follows
w =
{
w, if w ∈ G,
. . . (x · y) . . ., if w = . . . xy . . . with x, y ∈ Xi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(7)
where x · y is the product of x by y in the group Gi . One can prove that the word w
is uniquely determined by w and so the mapping is correctly defined. In particular,
this implies that given i ∈ n we have
x1 · · · xl ∈ Gi ⇔ x1 · · · xl = x j1 · · · x jl′ (8)
where { j1, . . . , jl ′ } = {1 ≤ j ≤ l : x j ∈ Gi } and j1 < · · · < jl ′ . Now given
g, h ∈ G the product of g by h in G equals gh.
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Lemma 3.1 Let G = G1 ∗ · · · ∗ Gn, K = K1 ∗ · · · ∗ Kn be groups and fi be an
epimorphism from Gi onto Ki , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Then the mapping
ϕ : G → K , x1 · · · xl → fi1(x1) · · · fil (xl) (9)
where x j ∈ Gi j , 1 ≤ j ≤ l, is an epimorphism. Moreover, ϕ|Gi = fi for all
1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Proof Since K =〈Y 〉 where Y = ∪ni = 1 K #i , the surjectivity of the mapping ϕ fol-
lows from the surjectivity of the mappings fi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Next, let ϕ0 : WX → WY
be the mapping taking x1 · · · xl to fi1(x1) · · · fil (xl). Then ϕ(g)=ϕ0(g) for all
g ∈ G and ϕ0(ww′)=ϕ0(w)ϕ0(w′) for all w,w′ ∈ WX . Since w w′ =ww′ for all
w,w′ ∈ WX , this implies that
ϕ(g)ϕ(h)=ϕ0(g) ϕ0(h)=ϕ0(g)ϕ0(h)=ϕ0(gh)=ϕ(gh)
for all g, h ∈ G. Thus the mapping ϕ is a homomorphism. Since obviously
ϕ|Gi = fi for all i , we are done. unionsq
Let H be a finite nontrivial group and K be the free product of cyclic groups
generated by all the elements of H#. Set
R(0) ={h(mh) ∈ WH# : h ∈ H#},
R(1) ={h(i)h′ ∈ WH# : h, h′ ∈ H#, 0 < i < mh, hi · h′ = 1H },
R(2) ={hh′h′′ ∈ WH# : h, h′, h′′ ∈ H#, h′ 
∈ 〈h〉, h · h′ · h′′ = 1H }
where h(i) is the word of length i ≥ 1 with all letters being equal h, mh is the order
of h ∈ H and “·” denotes the multiplication in H . Then one can see that
K =〈H#;R(0)〉 (10)
and there is the natural epimorphism ψ ′ : K → H ′ where H ′ = 〈H#;R(0) ∪
R(1) ∪ R(2)〉. Since relations belonging to R(i), i = 0, 1, 2, are satisfied in H , we
conclude that ker(ψ ′)h1 
= ker(ψ ′)h2 whenever h1 and h2 are different elements
of H (we identify 1K and 1H ). On the other hand, it is easy to see that any right
coset of K by ker(ψ ′) contains a word of length at most 1, i.e. an element of H .
Thus K = ∪h∈H ker(ψ ′)h and H ∼= H ′, whence the mapping
ψ : K → H, l → hl (11)
where hl is the uniquely determined element of H for which l ∈ ker(ψ ′)hl , is an
epimorphism with ker(ψ)= ker(ψ ′).
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3.2 Main construction of a homomorphic cryptosystem
Let us describe a homomorphic cryptosystemS(H)over a finite nontrivial group H .
If it is a cyclic group of an order m > 1, then we define S(H) to be the homomorphic
cryptosystem from section 2 (see Theorem 2.1). Otherwise we proceed as follows.
Let us fix a natural k (being a security parameter). Let H# ={h1, . . . , hn} where
n is a positive integer (clearly, n ≥ 3). Set Dk,H = ∪ni = 1 Dk,mi where mi is the
order of the group Ki =〈hi 〉 (see (5)). Given 1 ≤ i ≤ n choose ni ∈ Dk,mi and setSi =S(Ki ) to be the homomorphic cryptosystem over the cyclic group Ki with
respect to the epimorphism fi : Gi → Ki (see Theorem 2.1). Without loss of
generality we assume that Gi is a subgroup of the group Z∗ni . Then fi = fni ,mi , and
we set Ai = Ani ,mi , Pi = Pni ,mi , Ri = Rni ,mi and
G = G1 ∗ · · · ∗ Gn, f =ψ ◦ ϕ, (12)
where the mappings ϕ and ψ are defined by equations (9) and (11) respectively,
with K = K1 ∗ · · · ∗ Kn . From Lemma 3.1 and the definition of ψ it follows that
the mapping f : G → H is an epimorphism from G onto H .
To complete the construction we need to define a group A = Ak , a homomor-
phism P = Pk from A to G and randomly choose a transversal of ker( f ) in G. To
do this we set
Xϕ = X ∪ A0 X =
n⋃
i = 1
Gi \ ker( fi ), A0 =
n⋃
i = 1
Ai , (13)
all the unions are assumed to be the disjoint ones. Denote by → the transitive
closure of the binary relation ⇒ on the set WXϕ defined by
v ⇒ w iff w = x−1x0vx, v, w ∈ WXϕ (14)
where x ∈ X ∪ {1A} and x0 ∈ A0 ∪ {1A} with 1A being the empty word of
WXϕ . Thus v → w if there exist words v =w1, w2, . . . , wl =w of WXϕ such that
wi ⇒ wi+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ l − 1. We set
Aϕ = {a ∈ WXϕ : 1Aϕ → a},
Pϕ : Aϕ → G, a1 · · · ak → Pϕ(a1) · · · Pϕ(ak) (15)
where Pϕ |X = idX and Pϕ |Ai = Pi for all i . We observe that if v ∈ ker(ϕ) and
v ⇒ w for some v,w ∈ WXϕ then obviously w ∈ ker(ϕ) (see (14)). By induction
on the size of a word this implies that Pϕ(Aϕ) ⊂ ker(ϕ). A straightforward check
shows that Aϕ is a subgroup of the group 〈Xϕ〉. (Indeed, let v,w ∈ Aϕ . Obviously,
vw ∈ Aϕ whenever v ∈ A0 ∩{1A}. Arguing by induction of |v| it suffices to verify
that vw ∈ Aϕ whenever v = x−1x0x with x ∈ X ∪ {1A} and x0 ∈ A0 ∪ {1A}.
However, in this case we have 1A → w ⇒ xwx−1 ⇒ x−1x0(xwx−1)x = vw.) In
particular, the mapping Pϕ is a homomorphism. Similarly, the group Aψ and the
mapping Pψ defined by
Aψ ={r ∈ WRψ : f (r)= 1H }, Pψ : Aψ → G, a → a (16)
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where Rψ = ∪ni = 1 Ri , are the subgroup of the group 〈Rψ 〉 and the homomorphism
of it to G, respectively. Besides, it is easily seen that the restriction of ϕ to the set
Rϕ = G ∩ WR induces a bijection from this set to the group K . This shows that
Rϕ is a right transversal of ker(ϕ) in G. Finally we define the group A and the
homomorphism P by
A = Aϕ × Aψ, P : A → G, (a, b) → Pϕ(a)Pψ(b). (17)
Let R be a right transversal of ker( f ) in G, for instance one can take R ={1G} ∪
{r ′i }i∈n where r ′i is the element of Ri such that ψ(r ′i )= hi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We claim that the homomorphism P : A → ker( f ) is in fact an epimorphism.
Indeed, the set Rϕ defined after (16) is a right transversal of ker(ϕ) in G. So given
g ∈ ker( f ) there exist uniquely determined elements gϕ ∈ ker(ϕ) and rϕ ∈ Rϕ
such that g = gϕrϕ . Since
1H = f (g)=ψ(ϕ(gϕrϕ))=ψ(ϕ(rϕ))= f (rϕ),
we see that rϕ ∈ Aψ (see (16)). Besides, from statement (i2) of Lemma 3.3 (see
below) it follows that there exists a ∈ Aϕ for which Pϕ(a)= gϕ . Therefore, due
to (17) we have
P(a, rϕ)= Pϕ(a)Pψ(rϕ)= gϕrϕ = g
which proves the claim.
Let us describe the presentations of the groups A, G, K and H . Given 1 ≤ i ≤ n
the elements a ∈ Ai and g ∈ Gi being the elements of Z∗ni will be represented by
the “letters” ]a, i[ and [g, i], respectively. To multiply two elements g, h ∈ G one
has to find the word gh of WX . It is easy to see that this can be done by means of
the recursive procedure (7) in time ((|g| + |h|)k)O(1) (here [x, i] · [y, i]= [xy, i]
for all x, y ∈ Z∗ni where xy is the product modulo ni of the numbers x and y, and
ni ≤ expO(k) because ni ∈ Dk,mi ). Since taking the inverse of g ∈ G can be easily
implemented in time (|g|k)O(1), we will estimate further the running time of the
algorithms via the number of performed group operations in G and via the sizes
of the involved operands. The similar arguments work for the group A. Moreover,
relying on (14), (15) and (16) one can randomly generate elements of A. Finally,
the group H as well as the groups Ki , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are given by their multiplication
tables, and the group K is given by the presentation (10). So the group operations in
K can be performed in time polynomial in the lengths of the input words belonging
to WH# . Thus for the data we described the following statements hold:
(H1) the elements of the group A are represented bywords in the alphabet Xϕ∪Rϕ;
one can get randomly an element of A of size k within probabilistic time kO(1),
(H2) the elements of the group G are represented by words in the alphabet X; one
can test the equality of elements in G and perform group operations in G
(taking the inverse and computing the product) in time kO(1), provided that
the sizes of corresponding words are at most k,
(H3) the set R, the group H and the bijection R → H induced by f , are given
by the list of elements, the multiplication table and the list of pairs (r, f (r)),
respectively; |R| = |H | = O(1),
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(H4) given a word a ∈ A of the length |a| an element P(a) can be computed within
probabilistic time |a|O(1), whereas the problem INVERSE(P) can be solved
by means of the collection of the secret keys of cryptosystems Si , 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Statement (H4) needs to be explained more precisely. First, the epimorphism
P is polynomial time computable because of statement (i1) of Lemma 3.3 and
by Lemma 3.5 below the mappings Pϕ and Pψ are polynomial time computable.
Second, the problem INVERSE(P) can be efficiently solved by means of using
the trapdoor information for the homomorphic cryptosystems Si , i.e. the factoring
of integers ni ∈ Dk,mi . Indeed, suppose that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n there is an oracle
for the problem INVERSE(Pi ). Then given gi ∈ Gi one can find the element
fi (gi ) in time kO(1). So given g ∈ G the element l =ϕ(g) can be found in time
(|g|k)O(1) (see (9)). Since f (g)=ψ(ϕ(g))=ψ(l) and |l| ≤ |g|, one can find ψ(l)
by Lemma 3.5 and then test whether g ∈ ker( f ) within the same time. Moreover,
due to condition (H3) for cryptosystems Si one can efficiently find an element r
belonging to the right transversal Rϕ of ker(ϕ) in G such that ϕ(r)= l and |r | ≤ |l|.
Now if g ∈ ker( f ) then ψ(l)= 1H and so r ∈ Aψ . Furthermore,
ϕ(gr−1)=ϕ(g)ϕ(r−1)= ll−1 = 1K .
Finally, from statement (i3) of Lemma 3.3 it follows that one can find in time
(|g|k)O(1) an element a ∈ Aϕ such that Pϕ(a)= gr−1. Thus we obtain
P(a, r)= Pϕ(a)Pψ(r)= gr−1r = g = g,
which proves our claim.
We observe that given an element g ∈ G there exists the uniquely deter-
mined element r ∈ R such that f (g)= f (r) or, equivalently, f (gr−1)= 1H . Since
|R| = O(1), this implies that the problem of the computation of the epimorphism
f is polynomial time equivalent to the problem of recognizing elements of ker( f )
in G, i.e. in our setting to the problem TEST(P). The latter together with condi-
tions (H1)–(H4) enable us to define a homomorphic cryptosystem S(H) over the
group H in which the elements of G playing the role of the alphabet of ciphertext
messages, all the computations are performed in G and the result is decrypted to
H . More precisely:
Encryption: Given a plaintext h ∈ H encrypt as follows: take r ∈ R such that
f (r)= h (invoking (H3)) and a random element a ∈ A (using (H1)); the ciphertext
of h is the element P(a)r of G (computed by means of (H2) and (H4)).
Decryption: Given a ciphertext g ∈ G decrypt as follows: find the elements
r ∈ R and a ∈ A such that gr−1 = P(a) (using (H4)); the plaintext of g is the
element f (r) of H (computed by means of (H3)).
Now, the main result of the paper can be formulated as follows.
Theorem 3.2 Let H be a finite nontrivial group. Then under Assumption 1.1 the
homomorphic cryptosystem S(H) is semantically secure against a passive adver-
sary. In addition, given a number k the problem INVERSE(Pk) is probabilistic
polynomial time equivalent to the family of problems FACTOR(n,m) for appro-
priate n = exp(O(k)) and m running over the set of all orders of the elements
of H.
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3.3 Security of S(H)
Proof of Theorem 3.2 First we observe that if H is a cyclic group, then the required
statement follows from Theorem 2.1. Suppose from now on that the group H is not
cyclic. Again the first part of the theorem is straightforward (cf. [7,8]). To prove
the second part we consider the following sequence of the homomorphisms:
Aϕ × Aψ P−→ G1 ∗ · · · ∗ Gn ϕ−→ K1 ∗ · · · ∗ Kn ψ−→ H.
In the following two lemmas we study the homomorphisms ϕ and ψ from the
algorithmic point of view.
Lemma 3.3 For the homomorphism Pϕ defined in (15) the following statements
hold:
(i1) given a ∈ Aϕ the element Pϕ(a) can be found in time |a|O(1),
(i2) im(Pϕ)= ker(ϕ),
(i3) given an oracle Qi for the problem INVERSE(Pi ) for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the
problem INVERSE(Pϕ) for g ∈ G can be solved by means of at most |g|2
calls of oracles Qi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
(i4) for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n the problem INVERSE(Pi ) is polynomial time reducible
to the problem INVERSE(Pϕ).
Proof Let us prove statement (i1). Let a = a1 · · · al be an element of Aϕ . To find
Pϕ(a) according to (15) we need to compute the words Pϕ(a j ), 1 ≤ j ≤ l, and
then to compute the word w where w = Pϕ(a1) · · · Pϕ(al). The first stage can be
done in time |a|O(1) because each mapping Pi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is polynomial time
computable due to Section 2. Since the size of w equals |a|, the element Pϕ(a) can
be found within the similar time bound (one should take into account that in the
recursive procedure (7) applied for computing w from w the length of a current
word decreases at each step of the procedure).
To prove statements (i2) and (i3) we note first that the inclusion im(Pϕ) ⊂
ker(ϕ) was proved after the definition of Aϕ and Pϕ in (15). The converse inclusion
as well as statement (i3) will be proved by means of the following recursive pro-
cedure which for a given element g = x1 · · · xl of G with x j ∈ Gi j for 1 ≤ j ≤ l,
produces a certain pair (ag, tg) ∈ Aϕ × G. Below we show that this procedure
actually solves the problem INVERSE(Pϕ).
Step 1. If g = 1G , then output (1Aϕ , 1G).
Step 2. If the set J ={1 ≤ j ≤ l : x j ∈ ker( fi j )} is empty, then output (1Aϕ , g).
Step 3. Set h = x j+1 · · · xl x1 · · · x j−1 where j is the smallest element of the set J .
Step 4. Recursively find the pair (ah, th). If th 
= 1G , then output (ah, th).
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Step 5. If th = 1G , then output (ag, 1G) where ag = x1 · · · x j−1a jahx−1j−1 · · · x−11
with a j being an arbitrary element of Ai j such that Pi j (a j )= x j . unionsq
Since each recursive call at Step 4 is applied to the word h ∈ G of size at most
|g| − 1, the number of recursive calls is at most |g|. So the total number of oracle
Qi calls, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, at Step 2 does not exceed |g|2. Thus the running time of the
algorithm is (|g|)O(1) and statements (i2), (i3) are consequences of the following
lemma.
Lemma 3.4 g ∈ ker(ϕ) iff tg = 1G. Moreover, if tg = 1G, then ag ∈ Aϕ and
Pϕ(ag)= g.
Proof We will prove the both statements by induction on l = |g|. If l = 0, then the
procedure terminates at Step 1 and we are done. Suppose that l > 0. If the proce-
dure terminates at Step 2, then tg 
= 1G . In this case we have |ϕ(g)| = |g| = l > 0,
whence g 
∈ ker(ϕ). Let the procedure terminate at Step 4 or at Step 5. Then
|h| ≤ |g| − 1 (see Step 3). So by the induction hypothesis we can assume that
h ∈ ker(ϕ) iff th = 1G . On the other hand, taking into account that x j ∈ ker( fi j )
(see the definition of j at Step 3) we get that h ∈ ker(ϕ) iff ux j hu−1 ∈ ker(ϕ)
where u = x1, . . . , x j−1. Since
ux j hu−1 = x1 · · · x j−1x j hx−1j−1 · · · x−11 = x1 · · · xl = g = g, (18)
this means that g ∈ ker(ϕ) iff h ∈ ker(ϕ) iff th = 1G . This proves the first statement
of the lemma because th = tg due to Steps 4 and 5.
To prove the second statement, suppose that tg = 1G . Then the above argument
shows that h ∈ ker(ϕ) and so ah ∈ Aϕ and Pϕ(ah)= h by the induction hypothesis.
This implies that 1Aϕ → ah . On the other hand, from the definition of ag at Step 5 it
follows that ah → ag (see (14)). Thus 1Aϕ → ag , i.e. ag ∈ Aϕ (see (15)). Besides,
from the minimality of j it follows that x j ′ ∈ X (see (13)) and hence Pϕ(x j ′)= x j ′
and Pϕ(x−1j ′ )= x−1j ′ for all 1 ≤ j ′ ≤ j − 1 (see (15)). Since Pϕ(a j )= x j and
h = h = x j+1 · · · xl x1 · · · x j−1 (see Step 3), we obtain by (18) that
Pϕ(ag)= ux j Pϕ(ah)u−1 = ux j hu−1 = g
which completes the proof of the Lemma 3.4. unionsq
To prove statement (i4) let 1 ≤ i ≤ n and g ∈ Gi . Then since obviously
g ∈ ker( fi ) iff g ∈ ker(ϕ), one can test whether g ∈ ker( fi ) by means of an
algorithm solving the problem INVERSE(Pϕ). Moreover, if g ∈ ker( fi ), then
this algorithm yields an element a ∈ Aϕ such that Pϕ(a)= g. Then assuming
a = a1 · · · al with a j ∈ Xϕ , the set Ja ={1 ≤ j ≤ l : a j =]a∗j , i[} can be found in
time O(|a|) (we recall that due to our presentation any element a j is of the form
either ]a∗j , i j [ or ]a∗j , i j [ where 1 ≤ i j ≤ n and a∗j ∈ Z∗ni j , and Pi j (a j ) ∈ ker( fi j )
iff a j ∈ A0 iff a j =]a∗j , i j [). Now the element
a∗ =

 ∏
j∈Ja
a∗j , i


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obviously belongs to the set Ai ⊂ A0. On the other hand, since g ∈ Gi , we get by
(8) that
g = Pϕ(a1) · · · Pϕ(al)=
∏
j∈J
Pϕ(a j ), (19)
where J ={1 ≤ j ≤ k: Pϕ(a j ) ∈ Gi }. Taking into account that Gi is an Abelian
group and the mapping Pi :Ai → Gi is a homomorphism, we have
∏
j∈J
Pϕ(a j )=
∏
j∈Ja
Pi (a j )
∏
j∈J\Ja
Pϕ(a j )= Pi (a∗)
∏
j∈J\Ja
Pϕ(a j ). (20)
Moreover, since 1Aϕ → a, from equation (14) it follows that there exists involu-
tion j → j ′ on the set J \ Ja such that a j =]a∗j , i[ iff a j ′ = ](a∗j )−1, i[ (we recall
that a j =]a∗j , i[ for j ∈ Ja and a j =]a∗j , i[ for j ∈ J \ Ja). This implies that∏
j∈J\Ja Pϕ(a j )= 1G . Thus from equations (19) and (20) we conclude that
g = Pi (a∗)= Pϕ(a∗)= Pϕ(a∗).
This shows that the element a∗ ∈ Ai with Pϕ(a∗)= g can be constructed from
a in time O(|a|). Generating random elements of the groups Ai , one can effi-
ciently transform the element a∗ to a random element a˜ so that Pϕ(˜a)= Pϕ(a∗)= g.
Thus the problem INVERSE(Pi ) is polynomial time reducible to the problem
INVERSE(Pϕ). The Lemma 3.3 is proved. unionsq
Lemma 3.5 Let K be the group given by presentation (10) and the epimorphism
ψ is defined by equation (11). Then given v ∈ K one can find the element ψ(v) in
time (|v||H |)O(1).
Proof It is easy to see that the group K can be identified with the subset of the set
WH# so that w ∈ K iff the length of any subword of w of the form h · · · h (i.e. the
repetition of a letter h) is at most mh − 1. Having this in mind we claim that the
following recursive procedure computes ψ(v) for all v = x1 · · · xt ∈ K .
Step 1. If t ≤ 1, then output ψ(v)= v.
Step 2. Choose h ∈ H such that x1x2h ∈ R(1) ∪ R(2).
Step 3. Output ψ(v)=ψ(h−1x3 · · · xt ).
The correctness of the procedure follows from the definitions of sets R(1), R(2),
and the fact that recursion at Step 3 is always applied to a word the length of which
is smaller than the length of the current word. In fact, the above procedure produces
the representation of v in the form v =w1 · · ·wt−1ψ(v) where w j ∈ R(1) ∪ R(2)
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ t − 1 and ψ(v) ∈ H . Since obviously w1 · · ·wt−1 ∈ ker(ψ), we
conclude that ψ(v)= hv (see (11)). To complete the proof it suffices to note that
the running time of the above procedure is O(|v|(|R(1)| + |R(2)|)). unionsq
14
Finally, let us complete the proof of Theorem 3.2. We have to show only that
for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n the problem INVERSE(Pi ) (to which the factoring of integers
ni is reduced) is polynomial time reducible to the problem INVERSE(P). To do
this let g ∈ G. If g 
∈ ker( f ), then obviously g 
∈ ker(ϕ). Now let g ∈ ker( f )
and (a, b) ∈ A be such that Pϕ(a)Pψ(b)= g. Since Pψ(b) belongs to the right
transversal Rϕ of ker(ϕ) in G, it follows that g ∈ ker(ϕ) iff Pψ(b)= 1G . More-
over, if Pψ(b)= 1G , then obviously Pϕ(a)= g. Taking into account that the ele-
ment Pψ(b) can be found in time |b|O(1) (see (16)), we conclude that the problem
INVERSE(Pϕ) is polynomial time reducible to the problem INVERSE(P). Thus
our claim follows from statement (i4) of Lemma 3.3. Theorem 3.2 is proved. unionsq
4 Encrypted simulating of boolean circuits
Let B = B(X1, . . . , Xn) be a boolean circuit and H be a group. Following [1] we
say that a word
h1Xl1 · · · hm Xlm , h1, . . . , hm ∈ H, l1, . . . , lm ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (21)
is a simulation of size m of B in H if there exists a certain element h ∈ H# = H \{1}
such that the equality
h1xl1 · · · hmxlm = hB(x1,...,xn)
holds for any boolean vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n . It is proved in [1] that given
an arbitrary unsolvable group H and a boolean circuit B there exists a simulation
of B in H , the size of this simulation is exponential in the depth of B ( in particu-
lar, when the depth of B is logarithmic O(log n), then the size of the simulation is
nO(1)).
We say that for the circuit B we have an encrypted simulation over a homomor-
phic cryptosystem with respect to epimorphisms fk : Gk → H if for each k there
exist g1, . . . , gm ∈ Gk , and a certain element h ∈ H# (depending on k) such that
fk(gxl11 · · · gxlmm )= hB(x1,...,xn) (22)
for any boolean vector (x1, . . . , xn) ∈ {0, 1}n . Thus having a simulation (21) of
the circuit B in H one can produce an encrypted simulation of B by choosing
randomly gi ∈ Gk such that fk(gi )= hi , 1 ≤ i ≤ m (in this case, equality (22)
is obvious). Now combining the homomorphic cryptosystem of section 3 with the
above mentioned result from [1] we get the following statement.
Corollary 4.1 For an arbitrary finite unsolvable group H, a homomorphic cryp-
tosystem S over H, the security parameter k and any boolean circuit of the log-
arithmic depth O(log k) one can design in time kO(1) an encrypted simulation of
this circuit over S.
The meaning of an encrypted simulation is that given (publically) the elements
g1, . . . , gm ∈ Gk and h ∈ H# from (22) it should be supposedly difficult to eval-
uate B(x1, . . . , xn) since for this purpose one has to verify whether an element
g
xl1
1 · · · gxlmm belongs to ker( fk). On the other hand, the latter can be performed
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using the trapdoor information. In conclusion let us mention the following two
known protocols of interaction (cf. e.g. [2,21,22,24]) based on encrypted simula-
tions.
The first protocol is called evaluating an encrypted circuit. Assume that Alice
knows a trapdoor in a homomorphic cryptosystem over a group H with respect to
epimorphisms fk :Gk → H and possesses a boolean circuit B which she prefers to
keep secret, and Bob wants to evaluate B(x) at an input x = (x1, . . . , xn) (without
knowing B and without disclosing x). To accomplish this Alice transmits to Bob an
encrypted simulation (22) of B, then Bob calculates the element g = gxl11 · · · gxlmm
and sends it back to Alice, who computes and communicates the value fk(g) to
Bob. If the depth of the boolean circuit B is O(log k) and the homomorphic crypto-
system is as in subsection 3.2, then due to Corollary 4.1 the protocol can be realized
in time kO(1) (here we make use of that the size of a product of two elements in Gk
does not exceed the sum of their sizes).
In a different setting one could consider in a similar way evaluating an encrypted
circuit BH (y1, . . . , yn)over a group H (rather than a boolean one), being a sequence
of group operations in H with inputs y1, . . . , yn ∈ H . The second (dual) protocol
is called evaluating at an encrypted input. Now Alice has an input y = (y1, . . . , yn)
(desiring to conceal it) which she encrypts randomly by the tuple z = (z1, . . . , zn)
belonging to Gnk such that fk(zi )= yi , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and transmits z to Bob. In
his turn, Bob who knows a circuit BH (which he wants to keep secret) yields its
“lifting” f −1k (BH ) to Gk by means of replacing every constant h ∈ H occurring
in BH by a random g ∈ Gk such that fk(g)= h and replacing the group operations
in H by the group operations in Gk , respectively. Then Bob evaluates the element
( f −1k (BH ))(z) ∈ Gk and sends it back to Alice, finally Alice applies fk and obtains
fk(( f −1k (BH ))(z))= BH (y) (even without revealing it to Bob). Again if the depth
of the circuit BH is O(log k) and the homomorphic cryptosystem is as in Subsec-
tion 3.2, then the protocol can be realized in time kO(1). Note that the protocol of
evaluating at an encrypted input can be also accomplished using [24] in the way
different from the above. However, the approach of [24] unlike our construction is
not applicable directly to the protocol of evaluating an encrypted circuit.
It would be interesting to design homomorphic cryptosystems over rings rather
than groups (see [10]).
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